Sir Alex Younger, the former head of Britain’s foreign intelligence service MI6, told The Economist’s defence editor, Shashank Joshi, his conclusions after three weeks of the US/Israeli war against Iran. “The reality is that the U.S. underestimated the task and, I think, as of about two weeks ago, lost the initiative to Iran,” Younger said. “In practice, the Iranian regime has been more resilient than I think anyone would have expected.” “They’ve embarked on what’s technically called horizontal escalation-firing rockets at anybody within range-which at the time I thought was nuts, but in fact has been a very good way of putting an indirect price on the U.S. It’s sort of worked. They’ve also understood the significance of the energy war and held the straits at threat, essentially globalizing the conflict in a way that gives them some leverage. So they’ve played a weak hand pretty well.” “I think they are in their death throes,” he said about the IRGC and the Islamic Republic. “But the irony is that the biggest threat to them is peace, not war.” “The January uprising showed they have no answers. The hatred that was engendered is endemic and will last for decades. Estimates suggest up to 10,000 of their own citizens were machine-gunned in the streets by IRGC-backed militias.” “I don’t expect them to survive long term,” he said. “But ironically, this war gives them an extra lease on life, because it’s hard for opposition to organize during an air campaign, and they’re licensed to be even more brutal than before.”

HOST SHASHANK JOSHI, DEFENCE EDITOR, THE ECONOMIST: I feel the war is at this really important juncture. President Trump is trying to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by military means, through threats against Iranian power plants, and to seek to end the war through diplomatic talks. I think what people are struggling with-what I’m struggling with-is a full understanding of who has the upper hand right now, who is in a stronger position as that process unfolds. SIR ALEX YOUNGER, FORMER CHIEF OF BRITAIN’S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE: I regret having come to this conclusion because, like many MI6 officers of my generation, we faced the violence and brutality of the IRGC for most of our careers-that’s the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. So there is no love lost between us. And I shed no tears for Ali Khamenei, who was killed at the beginning of this war. But the reality is that the U.S. underestimated the task and, I think, as of about two weeks ago, lost the initiative to Iran. In practice, the Iranian regime has been more resilient than I think anyone would have expected. They took some good decisions early on about dispersing their military capability and delegating authority for the use of those weapons, which has given them significant extra resilience against this incredibly powerful air campaign. They’ve embarked on what’s technically called horizontal escalation-firing rockets at anybody within range-which at the time I thought was nuts, but in fact has been a very good way of putting an indirect price on the U.S. It’s sort of worked. They’ve also understood the significance of the energy war and held the straits at threat, essentially globalizing the conflict in a way that gives them some leverage. So they’ve played a weak hand pretty well. At the same time, Donald Trump has said some things that confirm what they already believed-that they’re in a civilizational war, a war of existence. America, by contrast, has embarked on a war of choice. In those terms, that’s imbued them with more staying power than their U.S. counterparts, and they know that now. I think that’s really giving them the whip hand. There’s also a technical point about drone stocks. While this has been an almost perfectly executed air campaign, you can’t reduce the threat to zero. And as long as you can’t reduce it to zero, Iran can hold the straits at risk. Even with just 10% of its initial drone stock, it can threaten shipping-not military audiences, but oil tanker owners and captains. That alone gives them leverage. So I think the options for the U.S. and Israel are pretty limited and not great. HOST SHASHANK JOSHI: That brings us to the question of the regime, which remains in place-weakened, but still standing. The Revolutionary Guard, the organization that planted roadside bombs that killed many of your colleagues, is still surviving. Have they been more resilient than you thought? How do you understand their endurance? SIR ALEX YOUNGER: I think they are in their death throes. But the irony is that the biggest threat to them is peace, not war. The January uprising showed they have no answers. The hatred that engendered is endemic and will last for decades. Estimates suggest up to 10,000 of their own citizens were machine-gunned in the streets by IRGC-backed militias. I don’t expect them to survive long term. But ironically, this war gives them an extra lease on life, because it’s hard for opposition to organize during an air campaign, and they’re licensed to be even more brutal than before. On the nuclear issue, perhaps 80% of Iranians are against the regime. That was reflected in the election of President Masoud Pezeshkian. It showed that a large majority want nothing more to do with this total resistance, theocratic ideology. But the 10–20% who support it are the ones with the guns, and that is proving decisive. They are empowered by this situation to continue brutalizing the population. We’ve seen attrition at the top of the regime, with new faces coming through-people like the new IRGC chief, General Vahidi, a former Quds Force commander. These are figures you would have seen up close in Iraq and Afghanistan. The net effect, which was probably going to happen anyway, is the end of the theocracy with the death of Ali Khamenei. His successor was never going to be as powerful. Even Mojtaba, although ostensibly a cleric, doesn’t have his father’s credentials. What you’re seeing is essentially an IRGC takeover-not a dictatorship so much as a junta. That’s how Iran is being run now. HOST SHASHANK JOSHI: Tell me more about the IRGC. They’re the armed force that guards the revolution, not the state. The regular army is disempowered. But how ideological are they? They also have major business interests and are involved in smuggling. Who are these people? SIR ALEX YOUNGER: They’re no less ruthless than Khamenei, but they are more corrupt and significant beneficiaries of the sanctions regime. They’re invested in the black economy created by long-standing sanctions. That’s one reason you might think they’d be more pragmatic. Mojtaba is really just a figurehead-we’ve barely seen him. These IRGC figures are in charge. None of them have a track record suggesting reform, but they are more pragmatic. HOST SHASHANK JOSHI: You say the regime is in its death throes, but that process could take a long time. What follows? What are the prospects for a democratic transition versus something more unstable? SIR ALEX YOUNGER: In some ways, this war may sustain their ability to brutalize the population. But after what happened in January, the chances of them maintaining control indefinitely are low. What comes next-who knows? I would listen for signs of internal dissent, particularly any buyer’s remorse over leadership decisions. Watch Masoud Pezeshkian. He’s fundamentally a secular reformist figure, but currently under the thumb of the IRGC. If he starts speaking more freely, that could signal the 80% of Iranians who’ve had enough beginning to prevail-not just demographically, but politically.
RealClearPolitics Videos